Civilian based defence system: New approach – Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian experience

/In Memoriam Gražina Miniotaitė (1948-2013)/

Introduction

Triumph of the „Solidarity” movement, breakdown of communism and collapse of the soviet empire than emergence of new states, allowed us for a quarter of century live in the belief that non-violence methods, in the authoritarian systems, could be effective.  Present – day world’s dramas, brutal conflicts in Syria and Middle East or lastly Ukraine-Russia War, brings a wave of doubt whether the rejection of violence has sense if it leads to death of thousands human beings and not everywhere ends successfully with a overthrow of the dictator’s regimes. The question arises, isn’t the catalogue of non-violent methods, perfectly collected and described by prof. Gene Sharp,  only the set of beautiful and idealistic watchwords, for a use within the societies where yet there’re  fixed principles and merits of democracy, respect for individual rights, where established rules of civil society work and is obvious for sides of political conflicts.   The first imposed finding that comes to mind is that: non-violent methods refer to such states and societies where both sides of conflict respect recorded  catalogue of principles and norms – both judicial and ethical.  Non-violent methods could be effectively applied in a such political systems where the justice mechanism efficiently reinforce this part which stands for truth, moral, judicial and material rights with its set of proofs and legal instruments to be defended.

Let’s set together two extreme cases of civil disobedience – peaceful protests in Syria (before the war broke out) and the “Occupy Wall Street” in the NYC. Irrespective of the results, authorities in USA and Syria applied   extremely different methods of combating opponents. During demonstrations in New York protesters could pull throughout many legal limitations; stood in the square without the right to make a noise and  create nuisance to others.  In Syria authoritarian regime shot participants of funeral ceremonies, so forced reaction and next funerals went smoothly to rebellion, with a real gunfire. Peaceful demonstrates have changed in few months into uprising.

Let’s see the Ukraine in fall 2013 and winter 2014, where authorities organized and financed massive counter-demonstrates consisting of regular hooligans (so called: titushki) to force peaceful protests, provoke riots and scuffles. Police didn’t react when groups of such titushki beat people of Maidan, kidnapped activists and killed some of them out of the town. Moreover, official media used disinformation, false and fake propaganda tricks to weak and break down opposition. Catalogue of methods – how to fight against so called color-revolution – has been effective and creative developed by many regimes in CIS countries since 2004 (Belarus, Azerbaijan Kazakhstan and others).

Revolution in Lithuania, protests in January 1991, represent unique lesson. Soviet communist regime in Moscow tried to stifle Lithuanian independence ambitions and aspirations  using tanks and special forces. Peaceful massive non-violent actions of civil disobedience, combined with a strong reaction of world’s media brought the victory with a relatively little amount of victims and shed blood.

Having in mind experience of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine and of course many other examples of ineffectiveness of the non-violent methods I would try to outline in this paper limited perspective and answer the question: how much the “tradition” of civil disobedience could strengthen the policy and security system of above mentioned countries?  How or whether these mechanisms and methods could be applied in a different situation – such as external aggression or deterring potential invader?  How much the civilian-based defense could impact security systems in Poland and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe?

 

Civilian-based defense (CBD) as a term/notion is strictly connected with a historical context of protest movements called civilian disobedience what then is strictly bonded with non-violent methods in political campaigns. It has appeared particularly in the second part of XX century, after Mahatma Gandhi’s activity in India. Professor Gene Sharp introduced this notion to political science in 70-ies.  Civilian-based defense is defined by Sharp as follows:

 

The term indicates defense by civilians (as distinct from military personnel) using civilian means of struggle (as distinct from military and paramilitary means). This is a policy intended to deter and defeat foreign military invasions, occupations, and internal usurpations. The latter includes both executive usurpations and the more usual coups d’états, that is, seizures of the physical and political control of the state machinery, often by an elite political, military, or paramilitary group from within or without the established government. Such coups may be conducted purely internally or may receive foreign instigation and aid. Deterrence and defense against external aggression and internal usurpation are to be accomplished by reliance on social, economic, political, and psychological weapons. (By “weapons” we mean those tools or means, not necessarily material that may be used in fighting whether in military or nonviolent conflicts.) In civilian-based defense these nonviolent weapons are used to wage widespread noncooperation and to offer massive public defiance. The aim is both to deny the attackers their objectives and to make impossible the consolidation of their rule, whether in the form of foreign administration, a puppet regime, or a government of usurpers. This noncooperation and defiance is also combined with other forms of action intended to subvert the loyalty of the attackers’ troops and functionaries, to promote their unreliability in carrying out orders and repression, and even to induce them to mutiny. [1]

Sharp describes in his book how the society and its institutions become the part of non-conventional and non-military war. What is the civilian disobedience? Reasoning of Sharp’s works we could define as a collective behavior and activity consisting in the ability to effectively interact (with tools and methods) to opposite political-military threats (occupation, informational aggression, cyberwar, economic conquest, defection and espionage). Civilian disobedience interacts with civilian-based defense.   In this context let’s review the notions civilian defense and civil defense, as interference to civilian-based defense.  It seems that in both case we have to do with two different and two close meanings, but two separate conceptual areas.

1. Civil defense or civil protection is limited to the state structures and formations of non-military population whose task is to support military and administrative actions in case of military conflict or invasion or in case of natural, humanitarian disasters.
2. Civilian-based defense is the concept that goes beyond the civil defense and determines the ability of society to subjective, trained and complex reaction  to threats not only of military character but also psychological, informational aggression (that could undermine fundaments  of state and in consistence leads to political, economic and military inroad).

 

Preparation of civil population in frames of civil defense provides technical and logistic training (first medical aid, assistance in military defense actions, ancillary works etc.). In frames of civilian-based defense training contains many activities of civil resistance like massive actions of civil disobedience what is detailed related in Gene Sharp’s papers and books.

 

Civilian-based defense by Gene Sharp

 

Non-violent methods of political campaigns were for almost two hundred years a subject of many researches by such intellectuals as Henry David Thoreau, Lev Tolstoy, William James, Bertrand Russel and many others. Theorists of war also perceived many civilian aspect of defense systems, among them Stephen King Hall^[2], Antoni Drago, Theodor Ebert, Johan Galtung, Brian Martina, Johan Niezinga, Adam Roberts and many others[3].

 

Sharp made a far-reaching systematization and proposed to recognize civilian-based defense as a one of most important and effective way of struggle both with external invader and dictatorship inside the state and with a use of developing catalogues of non-violent methods adopted throughout historical processes by many different societies in many different cultures.  In his book From Dictatorship to Democracy he enumerates and describes 198 methods of non-violent actions.^[4]. Most of these methods are related to political protests and activities inside country, especially campaigns against dictatorship. But when one looks at each described by Sharp form of activity could relate them likewise to the external aggressor, invader. For example:

–       communications with a wider audience (slogans, caricatures, and symbols; banners, posters, and displayed communications; leaflets, pamphlets, and books; newspapers and journals; records, radio, and television; skywriting and earthwriting);

–       symbolic public acts (display of flags and symbolic colors; wearing of symbols; prayer and worship; delivering symbolic objects; protest disrobings; destruction of own property; symbolic lights; displays of portraits; paint as protest; new signs and names; symbolic sounds; symbolic reclamations; rude gestures);

–       psychological intervention (self-exposure to the elements; the fast of moral pressure, hunger strike, satyagraphic fast; reverse trial; nonviolent harassment);

–       boycotts (economical, cultural,  aimed to specific individuals);

–       public assemblies and processions (until the occupant administration take restrictive measures);

–       noncooperation (“italian” strike, boycott of administration and political institutions);

–       international governmental action (changes in diplomatic and other representation; delay and cancellation of diplomatic events; withholding of diplomatic recognition; severance of diplomatic relations; withdrawal from international organizations; refusal of membership in international bodies; expulsion from international organizations)[5]

 

Furthermore Sharp draws our attention to extent of social mobilization that   demonstrated in many different mass actions, (e.g. patriotic character) have a great importance for deterring potential invader.  Planning his aggression invader would have taken into account the costs of subordinate or slavery, irrespectively destruction of its military and economic resources. This aspect of the state security system is commonly known for ages although often underestimated or recognized as insignificant.  A contemporary security system in many states characterizes one common feature – overestimation military means and so called hard segments of security (armament and equipment). Practice of non-violent methods depends on the cultural, political, economical, geographical context. Mix of methods containing non-violent coercion and resistance should be permanently trained and exercised to prepare society to easily identify its own and specific methods of communication, cultural and context codes or language, to build effective and unique non-violent defend strategy.

Sharp notes that difference between violent and non-violent action is sometimes tough to distinct. For instance devastation of enemy’s property, vehicles, means and tools of communication, roads, installations, fittings etc. could be hardly attached to peaceful activity. Alike physical and psychologically obstruction – for example inducing anxiety in the enemy’s functionaries’ family or environment.  We take into account also harming of the invader’s surrounding, its material interests and its sense of safety.  These types of action induce strong, overwhelming reaction, what in Poland is known from the history of the occupation during II WW (mass arrests, roundup, shooting, deportations, collective responsibility and obstruction of regular life, discrimination of churches and religious practices etc.).   This historical experience could be used to develop civil defense strategy, effectiveness of it depends on creativity and innovatory, skill to improvisation and modification of each method of non-violent resistance. Sharp’s catalogue of methods could be this way creative broadens, supplemented and modified.

Unchanging remain key factors and conditions that decide of effectiveness of methods of which Sharp pointed most important as follows:

 

1.the number of nonviolent resisters and their proportion in the general population;

2. the degree of the opponents’ dependence on the nonviolent resisters for sources of their power;

3. the skill of the nonviolent resisters in applying the technique, including the choice of strategy, tactics, and methods, and their ability to implement them;

4. the length of time that the noncooperation and defiance can be maintained;

5. the degree of sympathy and support for the nonviolent resisters from third parties;

6. the means of control open to the opponents and used by them to induce consent and force a resumption of cooperation, and the action of nonviolent resisters to those means;

7. the degree to which the opponents’ subjects, administrators, and agents support or refuse to support them, and the action that they may undertake to withhold that support and to assist the nonviolent resisters;

and the opponents’ estimate of the probable future course of the nonviolent struggle. ^[6]

Polish perspective

The history of organized civil protection formations starts at the end of I WW. Chemical weapons used by Germans, tragedy of civil society caused by bombardment of London, Paris and St. Petersburg realized to the military and political strategists that armed attack could be aimed not only at the military objects but at civil population behind the front line as well.  The time when warfare was waging between armies had long gone. During I WW aroused idea of so-called antiaircraft civil defense. This idea has gained social acceptance in France, Britain and Germany; these countries were pioneers. In 1921 in Poland was established Social Committee of Anti-Gas Defense, which was the first organization linking army and civilians; main goal was preparation/training of civilians how to be protected of effects of warfare. In the end of 1924 Committee was   transformed into Anti-Gas Defense Society (Towarzystwo Obrony Przeciwgazowej) and in 1928 was united with Antiaircraft Defense League. Since that time it’s been called Antiaircraft and Anti-Gas Defense League (Liga Obrony Przeciwpowietrznej I Przeciwgazowej).  In 1934 this organization was recognized by government as a public utility association.  Essentially, this organization backed army and was focused in organizing, equipping and training personnel, organization of the network of observation and reporting posts, lighting camouflage, constructing shelters, rescue and lifesaving trainings and supplying the population with personal protective equipment (gas masks). The civil, bottom up made institution has changed into a serious part of administration, whereby absorbed by the state. After 1945 when the communist regime eliminated the League the new authorities started to organize new form of civil defense. At the turn of 40-ties and 50-ties, when in Poland was expected III WW the Communists started to tie as much as possible the civilian population with army and its goals (ideologically as well) so civilian defense organization were used to keep population in permanent readiness to support Popular Army in the war with aggressors; which meant – West Germany, USA and NATO. In 1959 the authorities of Polish People’s Republic developed concept of Country’s Territorial Defense system. The civil defense became a component of state defense system. Somehow it had its significance in the system of ideological work with population. Communism provided total commitment of all society in the “soviet project”.  For the coordination all the activity of Country’s Territorial Defense Ministry of Defense and Communist Party established Countries’ Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Kraju) [7], which functions quickly turned from protective to ideological.

KOK was than enforced by legislation with many powers and competences to lead and control all the state. Besides its broad competences KOK became – in case of wartime – quasi-government.  Martial law announced in the night of 13th December 1981 was a logical and consistent result of the Communist system since the very beginning of the end of 40-ties. Civilian factor was less of importance.  Army in the Peoples’ Republic of Poland played a significant role in strengthening ideological fundament of administration, political system, economy and regular life of each citizen. So-called social support was very important for the management of army and party. Therefore Civil defense system (Obrona Cywilna) in frames of Countries’ Territorial Defense played a significant role. But in Communism the army didn’t serve nation. In contrary – all the nation, each inhabitant was obliged to serve army and ruling party.   As we know from the other histories of communist regimes many dictatorships practiced “War Communism” introduced by Lenin and practiced for many decades not only in Soviet Union. This is the reason why the role of Civil defense in Poland should be described throughout a historical background.

In 1993 many new legal regulations concerning civil defense were introduced, but in fact they duplicated the form and structure of Civil Defense of the past. The only significant change is the transfer of CD (OC) to the Ministry of Interior and turn into more “civil” by introducing this system to rescue and emergency services. In 1998 Minister of Interior and Administration established Emergency Response Team which coordinates all the activity (using formations of Civil Defense) to protect population and organize necessary aid in case of natural and human disasters. Headquarters of Civil Defense was at the same time changed into the Office of Emergency Management and Civil Protection. It role is to:

–       protect civil population, companies, public utilities, culture goods and heritage;

–       rescue and assistance to victims during the warfare;

–       cooperation of different institutions in case of natural disasters and removing results of such disasters;

 

In Poland civil defense is not defined subjective. What means that it’s not the bottom up formation. In the legal system there’s not the clarification what’s a kind of organization but we have only description of how it works and what type of tasks belong to Civil Defense. The new definition, necessary after entering to the European Union is hardly a subject of discussion among few experts but not still conscious in wider audience, in media or NGO. The key problem is that all EU member states (except of Poland) use another term – Civil Protection, what more precisely describes all mentioned above functions.[8]

There’s interesting difference of definitions – better expressed and explained in the in Austria, Germany and Switzerland – where Zivilschutz (protection) is much more narrow notion then Zivile Verteidigung (defense).

Polish National Security Office (within the Administration of the President) edited in 2013 so-called “White Book of Security” where we could notice significant broader field of interpretation for civil defense:

 

Security potency of the society is affected by national identity and cultural heritage. It is also a derivative of social security, demographic potential and intellectual, scientific and technological ability. Significant role play development of education and research in the field of security, healthcare system and media, national identity and heritage. Each nation develops and cultivates its values concerning own history which distinguishes it from the others and are the foundation for conviction of its distinct uniqueness. And on the other hand sense of belonging to a community, having a common consciousness and historical experience. The formation of Polish national identity unique role played by tradition associated with the struggles of independence, worship the glory of the Polish army as well as the nurturing of national memory, especially if insurgent war cemeteries. [9]

 

In this document authors mentioned how important role plays education in area of security, but still nowhere is mentioned that aspect which is strictly connected with catalogue of social activity leading to effective ability for cooperation in terms, tools and methods associated with resistance or disobedience to the threat of a politico-military invasion (occupation, symbolic or real colonization, media, cultural or information invasion, cyber attack, economic conquest, espionage, betrayal and ability to notice different mafia activity, etc.).

 

East European perspective

 

Experience of civilian-based defense is very instructive in case of Lithuania (years 1990-1991) and lately Ukraine. It shows how much civilian could be security as the important segment of public and political life. In these two countries we’ve witnessed social and public consensus on security system based and embedded in civilian, non-military concept and practice.

In Ukraine civil society goes fast course, training how to defend their own state, not only with a military means. In front of so-called hybrid-war[10] more serious is the threat for independency and democracy with a use of tools and instruments that undermines foundations and basic functions of state (psychological aspect of security, judiciary system rotten by corruption and lack of respect for the law, free speech and human rights). Threat comes when the society is smashed, when the doors are open for external media aggression and/or psychological war.

Therefore Ukrainian experience strengthens postulate to introduce into the system of education new type of defense training containing set of information about threats of contemporary warfare within media, psychology etc. Such education must be sensitive for various social and national groups – indicating different sensitivity for patriotism, regard for values (language, culture, local communities, merit of family life etc.)  that seal society and its strong relationship with national heritage. Very often in the discussions of many political groups and parties the European integration is presented as a threat for traditional values and national interests; however it is worth mentioning that this process is accepted by majority of polish society. The same approach to EU is visible within other East European societies. Globalization, “Europeanization” is presented by the opponents as the example of decay of our civilization. Ukrainians meet such arguments from the supporters of the idea of  Communism and USSR. Sentiments to “auld lang syne” (old good times of cold war when world was divided for two parts – West and East) are supported by examples of invasion of “gay culture” (Gayropa) and decadence. This tradition of Russian (and not only) philosophy, when eastern world is more valuable and wholesome for many Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans, becomes a great challenge. This is the place of a serious battle for souls and minds. This outdated ideological conflict is being used in the Russian-Ukrainian war and realizes in the intellectual elites in Kiev how important is this forgotten landscape of values and notions building national identity. And paradoxically Putin’s aggression on Ukraine strengthens its national identity and patriotism what provides with strong ability to defend country and harden national security system, whatever it means – military, economically, culturally etc.

 

Lithuanian approach

In the context of prof. Sharp’s activity Lithuanian example remains most important and significant for East Europe. His methods – how to fight with regime for independency – were “clinically” adopted by Lithuanian society in the years 1990-1991.  In the pro-soviet publications and books (for example see the output of Sergey Kara-Murza, published in the last decade in Russia in million of copies) Sharp has been named a front ideologist of  “colorful revolutions”. In Russian media Sharp was “unmasked” as a CIA emissary, whose role was to prepare societies in post-soviet area to carry out coups d’états, to introduce American model of democracy. It sounds a fun since Sharp as a younger refused to serve in army during the Korean War, sentenced and spent several months in a prison. But in fact Sharp’s books and articles were widely translated and distributed in Lithuania after proclamation of Independency in 1990 and the methods of non-violent resistance were adopted in dramatic events in January 1991.

One of the key figures, involved in these actions, was then chief of Security Service of the Head of Lithuanian Parliament and then Security Department Director (Krašto apsaugos departamento generalinis direktorius) Audrius Butkievičius. In cooperation with academics (among them prof. Gražina Miniotaitė)   Butkevičius has created Department for Civilian Defense within the Ministry of Defense. Many Lithuanian politicians were aware of that in case of armed soviet invasion their forces could not defend country for a long time. Therefore they decided to train people in civilian resistance actions that could help to survive time of occupation. Entering NATO seems for Lithuania not sufficient guarantee of the security system. This question has appeared after Russia’s invasion in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine 2014. This kind of hybrid warfare proofs how fragile is a peace and independence of newly established states on the area of former USSR.

Professor Gražina Miniotaitė in her long-term academic and research activity devoted a lot of works to the problem of practice of the civilian-based defense system[11].  In 1995 during a conference (Non-violence and tolerance in changing Eastern and Central Europe)[12] in Vilnius she presented very interesting paper about the presence of civilian based defense within the defense and security system of Lithuania.  Miniotaitė presented Lithuanian experience of defense by non-violent resistance that was adopted by politicians and society during the time of struggle to come off Soviet Union. She’s defined this sort of war for fundamental human and national rights as a civilian ability to resist without violence. Catalogue of methods was very obvious and easy to recognized – mass demonstrations, media activity, boycott of soviet institutions etc.. Of course on the other hand is obvious too – that the military aspects of state’s security system couldn’t be replaced by those methods of civilian resistance. We can only talk about some elements of civilian defense within state’s security system that comprise with non-military or non-violent aspects (education, training, media, psychological adjustment etc.) like it’s already adopted in the security strategy in Sweden or Switzerland. In some of European states there’s already performed a consistent policy of supporting civilian-based defense by subsidizing non-governmental organizations (Austria, Denmark, Holland). Gražina Miniotaitė stated that in the beginning of 90-ties, after Lithuania proclaimed and gained independence, appeared postulate to introduce to the state security system these skills and experience acquired during those two years. Different activities, courageous and organized attitude of the citizens of Lithuania, could be utilized to trainings of effective resistance in case of occupation or to boost all available means of defense, she proposed. She also noticed a great importance of the knowledge and academic output of prof. Gene Sharp. Minister of Defense Audrius Butkievičius ranked among these methods full arsenal of “moral and psychological” weapons. He’s revealed that leaders of self-defense movement (Savanoriškoji krašto apsaugos tarnyba, SKAT) were trained in using non-violent methods.  Lithuanian society was well informed by media and leaflets how to behave and use means of passive resistance methods. There was described how to organize massive gatherings in front of soviet soldiers, how to exert psychological pressure on invaders etc. Many of Sharp’s methods were based on the historical experience of Finland, India, Norway and Poland as well. Instructional text was published those days in a few newspapers and magazines.[13] Furthermore, Defense Department published a special booklet in many thousands of copies where Sharp’s methods and his outputs were presented. [14]

The leader of “Sajudis” movement prof. Vytautas Landsbergis also presented the principles of non-violent civilian resistance in his public speeches and many texts.[15]

In August 1991 when Lithuania gained independency, after unsuccessful Yanayev’s Putsch, many political scientists from West, especially from Scandinavian countries perceived Lithuanian experience as a “small states defense system” which is characterized by catalogue of public activities aimed to preserve national substance and to reduce ad maximum escalation of military hostilities of huge aggressor[16].   This catalogue includes passive resistance, disobedience and common refusal to come into closer relations with invader. Such moral and psychological resistance must be focused to deprive occupant’s army and administration of legitimacy and international recognition.  At the same time any kind of armed activity of military groups of rebels would have been recognized as favorable to the enemy.  But this is a tough and long-term task, which provides many-years’ training, education (contained patriotic and moral values, national and social merits). Each state, culture and civilization have its unrepeatable cultural code that must not be obviously ethnical or religious character.   For such states as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia multicultural and open society is the basic value that makes them attractive for neighboring Russia. This advantage allowed them to enter NATO and EU and become safer then many other former Soviet Union republics.

There’s one very interesting aspect of this process of “Europeanization”. Mentioned above Department of Civilian Defense within the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, established in 1992, has been canceled in 2004. All decade it dealt with trainings and preparations for non-violent activity for thousands of clerks, politicians, self-government officials, NGO activists etc. Beside it, academic environment in Lithuania conducted in 90-ties research projects concerning civilian resistance with a use of non-violent methods and political instruments. [17]

Miniotaitė stated in her works that civilian-based defense could be compared with a security belt in the vehicle, in case of military aggression.  In any case it mustn’t be replaced with a real military defense system. Civilian-based defense system could only supplement state’s security strategy and therefore deserves serious academic and expert analysis. Catalogue of trained by society non-violent methods could be a grave segment of strategic investment policy into state’s security system.

Unfortunately after Lithuania became NATO member in 2004 such practice and theory of CBD has been discontinued, ceased to play an important role and seems to be gone on the back burner. In the security strategy Lithuania gained UE system of civil protection, and within Ministry of Defense was established Department of Civil Protection what is far off formerly practiced principles of civilian-based defense.[18]

 

Ukraine – from peaceful demonstrations to Russian aggression

 

Ukraine’s ordeal of last year has a lot of common features with the phenomenon of civil resistance in Lithuania. Except of fact that after victory of Maidan external power decided to stop process of peaceful transformation.  The war with internal dictatorship has changed into the war with Russia.  Sociological surveys conducted at Maidan in December 2013 by research group of Warsaw University[19], showed that participants of the “dignity’s revolution” expected most of all enhance civil rights, freedom of speech and the fight against corruption.  Most of protest activity could be compared with Sharp’s catalogue of non-violent struggle. Dramatic change has come in tragic Thursday 20^th of February 2014 when almost 100 protesters were killed by snipers.

UW surveys proofed that Maidan demonstrants are high educated people (78%). So high civic identity is obviously out of question; that was not a social protest, for better life conditions, salary etc. Interviewers asked about value system of the participants of Maidan. Prof. Andrey Vardmatsky pointed few crucial and significant elements. First, this revolution was not about social demands but about civic liberties. Second, protesters identified themselves as “European” and a followers of “European values”, so demonstrations were against “anti-European” authority.

After months of winter’s protests, after strict measures used by police some of radical demonstrates (self-defense groups called Sotnia) provided themselves some weapons, gun. Secret service and police did know about it as demonstrates didn’t hide it, rather to discourage police. Information of the presence of weapons at Maidan was obvious in the police special troops “Berkut”. There was a fact that such escalations become tough to stop in dramatic days of 17-20^th of February. Police officers were afraid of their life as well as Maidan’s demonstrates. These enhanced aggression and fear on two sides. This way peaceful and non-violent demonstration after three cold months became aggressive forced and had changed into a regular armed activity. However, most of participants of Maidan were convinced that they are effective with their “almost non-violent” activity (barricades, fortifications, burning tires and destroying police’s vehicles, throwing stones and Molotov’s cocktails).

As a matter of fact, we could accept another supposition: if there were not weapons in hands of Maidan’s self-defense groups scenario of those events could appeared much more dramatic for protesters. Authorities decided on 19^th of February to introduce to the Maidan heavy equipment, so journalists called this picture: “Meat Grinder”. Next day snipers killed dozens of most active protesters.  And one additional detail that allows us to compare situation in Kiev with events in January 1991 in Vilnius. Both of it were presented the same way in Russian TV and media. Official propaganda in USSR and in Putin’s Russia tried to prove that leaders of protest movements hired snipers to blame the authorities. And another interesting fact: one of the chiefs of most radical self-defend group (Right Sector) Dmytro Jarosh was in these dramatic day of 20^th Feb receipt secretly by President Janukovych. What for? It remains unknown, however Jarosh was forced to confirm that meeting since journalists found his name at the book of visitors of Presidential residence. This information became sensational and allowed the interpretation as the radicals of Maidan could somehow collaborated with Moscow or at least with Ukrainian secret police.

Significant part of citizens of south and east part of Ukraine was under influence of Russian media, so many of them were convinced that Maidan is in fact a political coup d’états conducted by fascists and followers of UPA (Ukrainian Uprising Army of the time of 40-ties) and its leader Stephan Bandera or at least organized by Right Sector (Dmytro Jarosh). This disinformation and hysteria was of some use by separatists in the Donbas (eastern region of Ukraine).

After Russia’s aggression in Crimea in March 2014 we’ve shortly witnessed that the rebellion in Donbas is in fact the Putin’s project to stop Ukraine’s aspiration to establish strict relations with EU (Association Agreement).   Donbas’ rebellion became in July 2014 open Ukrainian-Russia war. Moscow used the traditional distrust to democratic authorities in Kiev of the pro-Russian population living in the eastern part of country. But in the fall of 2014 for most of Ukrainian citizens, even for those of Donbas became clear that they have to deal with the real and brutal war against the territory and independence of Ukraine state. After few of months number of followers of rebels from Donbas has significantly decreased.

In March we saw Ukrainian military troops singing national anthem and leaving their positions in Crimea. In July-August armed forces of Ukrainians bravely started to fight to preserve territory of homeland.  Most of Ukrainian soldiers are volunteer corps. They are supported by civil society, ad hoc organizations that supplied defenders food, water and equipment. Very popular is to participate in the military trainings. Maidan as an idea in few months has changed radically and broaden its influence all over Ukraine; but stopped to be a non-violent action.  Regular people discuss a different problems than it was in 2004 (Orange revolution) and in the first months of 2014. Now, we hear them debating on army supplies, methods of defense cities (Mariupol), strengthening security system, fighting with corruption and politically changing the “dignity revolution” into the civilized country’s system.

Comparing current situation in Ukraine with Lithuania in 1991 seems to be justified. However Lithuanians hadn’t enough power to defend their independency with a military means. Armed resistance is rather hard to imagine that time as the soviet army and special services were much more dominate. Ukraine is a larger scale country with its army (even as it so weak) big population and with a high morale advantage over invaders, patriotic spur and real readiness to fight. This makes a great inconvenience for Russia.

Nonetheless applying non-violent methods seems reasonable and in many situations could be effective for Ukraine’s time of war with a huge neighbor. What comes up from viewpoint of Sharp’s achievement are for sure:

1. demonstrations and patriotic actions (marches, pickets, artistic events, installations , social media actions etc.);
2. public actions to support army (concerts for soldiers, collecting money) as well as political action to press on authorities and parliament to eliminate corruption (concerning army supplies and tenders) and against sending to front line youngest soldiers without preparations and experience etc.;
3. solidarity actions overseas (with presence of diaspora and allied ethnic groups in USA, Canada and West Europe);
4. diplomatic activity (boycott of Russia’s cultural, economic and political activity overseas, sanctions, building international coalition to hold back invasion etc);
5. symbolic actions in the internet (films, songs, artistic performance, memes ets);
6. media activity (stop-fake programs as reaction to Russian propaganda).

 

All these sorts of activity could not stop military aggression, mass killings and brutality. Non-violent civilian-based defense is rather postulated for an international legal system then an effective method that could stop real warfare. And this is the picture that comes out of the Ukrainian – Russian war. No one could dare to write prescription when the war has broken out. But it is necessary to give us a task for future.  Especially when we have to do with the distinction between civil defense or civil protection and civil resistance.

 

Previous manner of functioning civil defense was in Ukraine and in post-soviet countries very similar with that we’ve already described above of Polish experience.[20] Reading documents of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense we learn that civil defense is understood as a support of army by Civic Council within the Ministry. There are about 75 representatives of different organizations (kozacks, trade unions, social groups etc.). Once a year MD prepares a “White Book” containing among other problems outline of the public tasks of civil society connected with a basic army activity. [21]

Existing components and structures of so-called service of civil defense, known from the time of USSR, were transformed at the beginning of 90-ties and incorporated into the system of the Ministry of Emergency of Ukraine.  Relations between civilians and army and the tasks of protection of civil people went to the Ministry of Defense.

But we see these days that there is a new situation in the country that changes viewpoint. Civilian factor plays in 2014 entirely different role – regular people started to organize the bottom up actions to support army (food and equipment supplies, medical assistance delivered straightway to the front line).  And the role of public control has grown up incomparably with the past time. Common security, independence and territorial integrity have become a priority and the understanding of common, mutual defense comes out besides hitherto regulations and practice. So it is justified to claim that we have to deal with a new or refreshed form of civilian based defense in Ukraine, much more spontaneous and commonly reinforced. It is visible even in the grassroots, patriotic-based actions which are focused to demonstrate ties with the Homeland and to change, adjust or reform past corruptive and ineffective system.

Summing up, we have in Ukraine to do with new, not completed, process of building civilian based defense system.  How will look output in the result is tough to predict since the wartime is very dynamic. Last 20 years’ experience and neglected both army and civilian defense resulted with dramatic effects.

From todays’ perspective Ukrainians admit that if the work was done, if the media were more “civic”, if the national values were more cared by authorities, if the politicians worked more for national solidarity the dramatic partition or secession, external aggression would never happened.

Ukraine’s example very distinctly proves that the weaker state’s institution, the more   acquiescence for corruption, the greater influence of oligarchs, the more external actors of economical processes or decisions the more powerless and infirm ability to defend Homeland. All these problems described above have indirect influence for development of civilian-based defense system.

 

Conclusions

Presented paper shows differences between civilian-based defense and civil defense (in EU known as civil protection).  The first is a subjective and motivated process of building security system with a major participation of civic society within a democratic state.  It means that civic organizations and representatives cooperate within the states’ security institutions not only by the elected formal parliamentary representation. In the democratic state civic society brings to the security system non-military component concerning all these cultural and axiological behave that could firm ability to protect country from – however understood – external threats. Among these abilities and skills are those methods that are described by Gene Sharp in his works on non-violet actions.

 

Civil defense (in the EU called civic protection) is the institutional system aimed to skill cooperation of civil people and professionals of emergency to secure human life and material wealth and material goods in case of warfare or/and natural disaster.

Gene Sharp who developed theory of non-violent resistance disseminated civilian-based defense, as a notion.

Lithuanian history of 1991 showed that consistently developed defense system, without the use of military means could be effective and bring intended results. The methods adopted in Vilnius in January 1991, well described in works of Gražina Miniotaitė, could not be literary/mechanically transferred to other cultural areas or societies far form “European” model of civilization. Sharp’s methods could not be also used to systems where conflict parts do not confess the same system of values (justice, regard for human rights etc.). Essential element is the possibility to use international factor to deter or contain invader/dictator (international organizations impact, media influence, sanctions and boycott etc.).

The case of Ukraine illustrates that civilian resistance against dictatorship could evaluate into the international conflict. This specific situation characterizes post-colonial states and shows tough dependence of former “patron” that attempts to maintain its influence and control over the liberated country.

Crimea occupation, hybrid war induced by Russia let Ukraine start process of redefinition of identity and helped building new subjectivity. In this process the key role plays the civilian-based defense.  Ukrainian experience of practical solidarity, in front of war – with its specific limitations – proves that Sharp’s methods are effective.

Final conclusion may be – relying on described above examples of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine – the deep convenience that building state’s security system this what we called civilian-based defense or its elements mustn’t be rejected anywhere.

 

Mariusz Maszkiewicz

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Summary

Set of methods, prepared by Gene Sharp, how to struggle against regime non-violent way could be applied in principle to oppressive, dictatorial systems. Experience of polish Solidarity movement, Lithuanian Sajudis and Ukrainian Majdan tend me to put research postulate: whether and how we can take advantage of this positive experience of civic movement in building state security system, especially against external threats and aggression? Effectiveness of non-violent methods let us in the past (last 25 years) believe that non-violent methods are successful however their final results could appear not at once.

Contemporary world with its brutal reality of terrorism, war in Syria, Ukrainian-Russian conflict and many others brings us another wave of doubt: has non-violent struggle a sense? The doubt is additionally fixed when we see that effectiveness of non-violent methods is possible rather in states or societies with certain strong system of values and rife, prevalent codex of ethic norms recognized by both parties of conflict.  Non-violence is accepted within the political systems that have strong and well functioning justice system that backs moral rights presented by society or its part.

How does it relate to a different culture, a different political reality in which brutal violence, mass killings are not for the ruling regime brake? Revolution on Kiev Majdan showed how the power could use refined and absolute methods against peaceful demonstrates.  Simply police instruments are additionally boosts by state disinformation and sent hooligans, criminal elements (titushki), provocateurs who initiate brawls and fights to create a completely different picture of the demonstration and change the tone of the declared objectives of protest.

When the power did must eventually bend the situation in Ukraine turned out and that the victory Maidan led to the emergence of inspired from outside the armed rebellion in the east of Ukraine and the Russian aggression, in the form of so-called hybrid war. Such situation opens anew question about effectiveness of non-violent methods?  Lithuanian philosopher Grażyna Minotaite that unexpectedly passed away last year, in her long creative and academic activities devoted to this issue a lot of place formulating since the early 90’s very interesting postulate concerning the presence in the Lithuanian defence system elements of so called civilian-based defence.  She illustrated effective defence against aggression on the example of the Lithuanian experience during the struggle for independence.

This period was an example of the fight without the use of military means and without presence of paramilitary organisations (partisans).  This kind of fighting constitutes an alternative civic resistance against the threats to fundamental rights and freedoms by methods of non-violence. The tradition of non-violent methods of struggle is still the subject of research of many generations of intellectuals, from Henry David Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy, William James, Bertrand Russell, to the contemporary Gene Sharp. The issue of civil resistance in frames of the war/defence was interest of such theorists as Stephen King Hall, Anthony Drago, Theodor Ebert, John Galtung, Brian Martin, Johan Niezing, Adam Roberts and many others. It appears that no country in the world did not constitute civil opposition itself and not replace defence system of a military nature. You can talk while having some elements of the national security strategy containing the civic factor (Sweden, Switzerland). In other countries it leads to a consistent policy of support for the system of civic / social defence by subsidizing specialized NGOs (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands).

The methods of non-violent struggle, which effectively applied Sajudis, make expand – in terms of academic or theoretical expertise – and broaden practical aspects of state’s civil defence. According to Minotaite civic actions without the use of violence may be compared to the seat belt in the car, particularly in case of military defeat or occupation of the State. This could be a type of action and preparation of alternative security system to the national one but in any case doesn’t replace its real military dimension.

Nevertheless, what we call civilian based defence system deserves a deep academic and theoretical analysis, in order to be implemented into national defence system by fusing behaviour and technology, civil resistance and methods of opposition to the hypothetical invader and aggressor.

Mariusz Maszkiewicz May/June 2014